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Forces of Federalism, Safety Nets, 
and Waivers
Edward H. Stiglitz*
Inequality is the defining feature of our times. Many argue that it 
calls for a policy response, yet the most obvious policy responses 
require legislative action. And if inequality is the defining feature of 
our times, partisan acrimony and gridlock are the defining features 
of the legislature. That being so, it is worth considering what role 
administrative agencies, and administrative law, might play in 
ameliorating or exacerbating economic inequality. Here, I focus on 
American safety net programs, many of which are joint operations 
between federal administrative agencies and state governments. In this 
context, a central mode of bureaucratic policy innovation comes in 
the form of administrative waivers, whereby a federal administrative 
agency waives some statutory requirement that is otherwise binding 
on state administrators. For example, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services recently granted waivers to allow several states to 
impose various “personal responsibility” requirements on Medicaid 
beneficiaries.
Faced with a choice between legislative inactivity and policy 
innovation through waivers, many scholars and policymakers of 
both parties have tended to favor waivers. The appeal of waivers 
as a path around legislative gridlock is compelling. However, I 
argue that this view has neglected the federal structure of American 
safety net programs, and does not account for the state politics of 
implementation. Moreover, scholars have not focused on the severe 
information problems that federal agencies face when issuing waivers; 
a permissive waiver regime exacerbates these problems. Focusing on 
Medicaid implementation, I highlight the risks of waivers for American 
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safety net programs. Before concluding, I discuss possible reforms 
to administrative procedures, and offer a case study of litigation 
surrounding one recent waiver application. The case study illustrates 
many of the theoretical arguments, and further demonstrates the 
failure of judicial review; it indicates how review might be adjusted 
to promote more effective use of waivers and diminish their perils.
IntroductIon
Inequality is the defining feature of our times. Many argue that it calls for a 
policy response,1 yet the most obvious policy responses require legislative action. 
And if inequality is the defining feature of our times, partisan acrimony and 
gridlock are the defining features of the United States legislature. Congressional 
productivity is at an all-time low, and the trend, moreover, is toward even 
less lawmaking. One consequence of this development is that any sort of 
large-scale scheme affecting inequality that requires statutory revisions is 
likely to meet its death in a congressional committee; or if not there, on the 
floor of one house or the other; or if not there, by the veto pen.2 A corollary 
of this point is that the moving joints of policymaking, it is increasingly clear, 
fall predominately at the administrative and state levels. That being so, it 
is worth examining efforts to reduce or resist increases in inequality at the 
administrative and state levels.
In this Article, I focus on American safety net programs, many of which 
represent joint operations between federal agencies and state governments.3 
1 For example, virtually any important tax reform would require the participation 
of Congress. For one such thoughtful reform proposal, see, for example, James 
Kwak, Reducing Inequality with a Retrospective Tax on Capital, 25 Cornell 
J.l. & Pub. Pol’y 191 (2015) (proposing a capital tax based on historical values, 
and collecting references for related proposals). 
2 For a classic article on legislative gridlock, see Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics 
of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 Am. Pol. SCi. rev. 519 (1999).
3 Much of the rise in inequality comes from explosive growth at the top of the 
distribution, e.g., Anthony Atkinson et al., Income Inequality in the Long Run, 
49 J. eCon. lit. 3 (2011), and efforts to study the causes and consequences of 
inequality will therefore naturally need to pay close attention to what happens 
on the right tail of the distribution. However, even as the top of the distribution 
tells much of the story in the rise of economic inequality, it is morally important 
also to address the left tail of the distribution and those most adversely affected 
by the forces driving inequality. Safety net programs relate to just this segment 
of the population.
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Medicaid is one such critical safety net program: it is a healthcare program for 
lower-income individuals that has been shown to yield gains to beneficiaries 
in terms of reduced mortality, as well as increased education, income, and 
intergenerational mobility.4 Reflecting its centrality, the program has indeed 
been the subject of much recent litigation and political warfare.5
Within this context, a focal point of the agency-state interaction, and the 
topic of extensive academic commentary, is the waiver application. A waiver 
provision in a statute allows an implementing agency to “waive” certain 
otherwise binding statutory provisions. In the Medicaid context, for example, 
the relevant agency — Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) — 
has granted waivers to states that allow them to use federal funds to purchase 
private insurance (the “private option”) and to impose various “personal 
responsibility” requirements on beneficiaries.6 Without a waiver, the states 
could not have formed these policies and maintained their federal funding. 
Waivers introduce discretion into the administrative process, and might, in 
principle, be used either to enlarge or restrict federal safety net programs. 
For instance, aside from allowing states to impose personal responsibility 
requirements on beneficiaries, they also helped the rise of Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) in the 1990s,7 and in the early 2000s they played an 
important role in launching Massachusetts’s universal healthcare program.8
Largely as a result of this potential for policy innovation amid a gridlocked 
Congress, waivers have attracted adherents from all sides of the political 
spectrum. President Clinton encouraged states to apply for waivers, particularly 
4 See David W. Brown et al., Medicaid as an Investment in Children: What Is the 
Long-Term Impact on Tax Receipts? (NBER, Working Paper No. 20835, 2015); 
Rourke O’Brien & Cassandra L. Robertson, Medicaid and Intergenerational 
Economic Mobility (2015) (unpublished manuscript). 
5 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 1 (2012).
6 JAne b. WiShner et Al., robert Wood JohnSon Found. & urbAn inSt., mediCAid 
exPAnSion, the PrivAte oPtion, And PerSonAl reSPonSibility requirementS: 
the uSe oF SeCtion 1115 WAiverS to imPlement mediCAid exPAnSion under 
the ACA (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-
pdfs/2000235-Medicaid-Expansion-The-Private-Option-and-Personal-
Responsibility-Requirements.pdf.
7 See, e.g., Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using 
Section 1115 Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 
15 yAle J. heAlth Pol’y l. & ethiCS 213 (2015).
8 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 yAle l.J. 1996, 
2005 (2013); Frank J. Thompson & Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism 
and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications for Policy and Democratic 
Process, 32 J. heAlth Pol. 971 (2007). 
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after his healthcare overhaul failed in Congress; President G.W. Bush also 
pressed waivers; and much the same can be said of President Obama.9 
Particularly lately, legal scholars have likewise advocated the merits of 
waivers. An influential article by David Barron and Todd Rakoff applauds the 
rise of waivers, in large part because they open the door to policy innovation.10 
Jonathan Adler, similarly, advocates their use in the environmental context;11 
in like spirit, Samuel Bagenstos argues, on balance, for waivers in healthcare 
and other policy areas;12 noting an ineffective Congress, Jessica Bulman-
Pozen sees a good case for waivers and other forms of executive federalism;13 
and at least in this polarized world, Gillian Metzger concurs in observing 
that waivers facilitate policy movement and bipartisan cooperation.14 These 
scholars offer thoughtful and balanced views on waivers, but if our concern 
is inequality and the viability of safety net programs, this Article contends 
that the literature gives insufficient respect to two points.15
9 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, 
in the heAlth CAre CASe: the SuPreme Court’S deCiSion And itS imPliCAtionS 
227 (Gillian Metzger, Trevor Morrison & Nathaniel Persily eds., 2013).
10 David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. l. 
rev. 265 (2013). 
11 Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur 
Environmental Innovation, in the JuriSdynAmiCS oF environmentAl ProteCtion: 
ChAnge And the PrAgmAtiC voiCe in environmentAl lAW 263 (J. Chen ed., 
2004).
12 Bagenstos, supra note 9.
13 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 vA. l. 
rev. 953 (2016) (“[T]aking politics into account, there is a strong case for state-
differentiated federal policy as compared to the alternatives that emerge from 
a polarized Congress.”).
14 Gillian Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. l. rev. 
1739 (2015). 
15 The spirit of these points follows Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 
minn. l. rev. 317 (1997). Metzger notes a rupture between judicial doctrine 
in federalism and what we know about decentralization and centralization from 
social science. See Metzger, supra note 14. I also note that others have expressed 
caution about waivers in the past. See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk 
Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy 
Retrenchment in the United States, 98 Am. Pol. SCi. rev. 243 (2004) (“[T]he joint 
federal-state structure of the program . . . has facilitated cutbacks by fostering 
interstate competitive pressures in favor of budgetary stringency, while making 
cutbacks more difficult to identify and assign responsibility for.”). However, 
this type of consideration is all but absent from the more recent legal literature 
on waivers; hence this Article.
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The first is that waivers represent a form of managed devolution, and that 
forces that operate at the level of state implementation generally, even if not 
uniformly, move toward retrenchment. Scholars have long been concerned 
that jurisdictional competition places downward pressure on benefits levels, 
as states fear that overly generous benefits will attract beneficiaries from 
nearby states.16 Moreover, a common view is that it is more difficult for states 
to implement counter-cyclical policies;17 budgets are most pressed during 
economic downturns, precisely when safety nets have the most importance, and 
least pressed during times of economic expansion, precisely when safety nets 
have the least importance. To the extent that this form of managed devolution 
sensitizes safety net programs to any of these dynamics, it undermines the 
core purpose of safety nets and threatens increases in inequality. These forces 
are well known, but they have largely been ignored by the recent waiver 
literature, which focuses on the possibility of policy innovation rather than 
the nature of any such innovations.18
A second dimension of these waiver-facilitated programs is less well known 
— but it is at least equally important. Although the bureaucrats working at 
the agency level have expertise in their policy areas, they also face severe 
information problems with respect to state waiver applications. States, of course, 
tend to couch their applications in public-regarding terms that advance the 
purposes of the statutory scheme: the waiver request represents an “experiment” 
in healthcare delivery, or an “innovation,” or it is “necessary” to implement 
the policy under prevailing state economic or political conditions.19 Yet it is 
difficult to know what motivates the state’s waiver. The waiver may or may 
not be “necessary,” for example; such a determination that depends on detailed 
knowledge of local conditions. A permissive posture on waivers is likely to 
16 See, e.g., PAul e. PeterSon, the PriCe oF FederAliSm (1995). One might also be 
concerned that, even absent this migration-related fear, states with conservative 
governors may seek waivers to reduce benefits or eligibility as a way to “show” 
their ideological bona fides to a voting public with incomplete information. 
The fact that Governor John Kasich expanded Medicaid in Ohio under the 
Affordable Care Act, without a waiver, but is considering seeking a waiver to 
reduce eligibility now that he is running for president, lends some plausibility 
to this concern. Either way, the result is similar: a form of competition among 
states driving down benefits levels.
17 For recent evidence, see glenn Follette & byron lutz, FiSCAl PoliCy in 
the united StAteS: AutomAtiC StAbilizerS, diSCretionAry FiSCAl PoliCy 
ACtionS, And the eConomy (2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/
FEDS/2010/201043/201043pap.pdf.
18 See supra notes 9-14.
19 See infra Parts III-IV.
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exacerbate the tendency of states to falsely represent their motivations for 
pursuing a waiver, which may in truth have ideological, partisan, or electoral 
roots. Particularly when combined with the structural forces, above, that 
place downward pressure on benefits, this informational problem colors our 
understanding of how waivers operate and, insofar as one is concerned by 
economic inequality, encourages skepticism of the administrative tool.20
These concerns have not to my knowledge entered the recent waiver 
debate, but it is clear that — admitting that waivers introduce the possibility of 
innovation — we might not necessarily applaud all forms of “innovation.” This 
is particularly true where, as in most theories of federal policy implementation, 
the direction of the innovation is generally predictable, and where the flexibility 
that makes room for innovation also weakens the bargaining position of the 
federal government.21 Indeed, such downward forces plausibly prompted the 
need for federally assisted safety net programs in the first instance — local 
and state efforts proved inadequate absent the presence of federal funding 
and statutory standards.22 I stress that these points should be understood as 
articulating a theoretical and institutional basis for concern, and not necessarily 
as factual descriptions of the prevailing waiver regime. A major motivation 
for this Article, that is, is to conceive of waivers as an enduring institution 
and to try to understand the long-run forces at play, with implications for 
inequality. This perspective suggests that waivers should not be cheered, but 
rather eyed with suspicion.
Before closing, I consider how agencies and the courts might respond to these 
institutional forces, with the twin goals of ensuring flexibility and safeguarding 
statutory objectives. I do so in part through a case study of litigation surrounding 
a recent Medicaid waiver for Arizona. This case study vividly illustrates the 
information problems that agencies face and largely represents a story of failure 
at levels of both the agency and the court; it shows how neither agencies nor 
courts can be trusted, without more being done, to ward off unmeritorious waiver 
requests. In the main, I argue for greater formality in the procedures required to 
receive a waiver, and for more searching review of the resulting record. At least 
in the Medicaid context, the Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act (ACA)23 
20 See infra Sections III.A, IV.B; infra Appendix.
21 See infra Part II.
22 ShAnnA roSe, FinAnCing mediCAid: FederAliSm And the groWth oF AmeriCA’S 
heAlth CAre SAFety net (2013).
23 Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act, Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010).
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took positive steps in this regard, but even here procedural reform remains 
incomplete.24
This Article proceeds as follows. First, using Medicaid as the running 
example, I discuss in Part I the legal status of waivers, their use over time, and 
the current perspectives of the literature. In Part II, I present a main concern 
with the prevailing view: that it ignores the politics of state implementation, 
and that various forces have a predictable effect on policies. In Part III, I 
present an argument about how information problems infect state-agency 
bargaining in the context of various waiver regimes; I include a more formal 
representation of this argument in the Appendix. In Part IV, I discuss the role 
of administrative procedures and judicial review in managing waivers. My 
conclusions follow.
I. WaIvers
Waiver authority is delegated from Congress to administrative agencies in the 
manner of any other delegation of authority. What is different about waivers 
is that they delegate to agencies the authority to waive or remove, at least 
temporarily, otherwise binding statutory provisions. Congress has included 
waiver provisions in statutes at least since the 1960s,25 and agencies have 
used them intensively since the G.H.W. Bush administration.26 Subsequent 
presidential administrations have routinely employed waivers to give states 
flexibility in cooperative federal programs and advance policy objectives 
in the face of congressional gridlock. Indeed, as others have suggested, this 
timing is likely not coincidental: the fact of congressional gridlock and the 
increasing use of waivers likely run together.27
The scholarly literature on waivers tends to defend them. Scholars 
acknowledge that this sort of “negative” delegation is unusual, and therefore 
worthy of consideration, but then tend largely to conclude that, though negative, 
24 See infra Section IV.A. 
25 As discussed below, perhaps the most common form of waiver — Section 1115 
waivers — arrived in the Social Security Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 
Stat. 172 (1962), and therefore predates Medicaid. 
26 dAvid g. Smith & Judith d. moore, mediCAid PolitiCS And PoliCy: 1965-2007, 
at 281 (2009).
27 See, e.g., Saundra K. Schneider, Medicaid Section 1115 Waivers: Shifting Health 
Care Reform to the States, 27 PubliuS: J. FederAliSm 89 (1997) (noting the turn 
to Medicaid waivers in the aftermath of President Clinton’s failed healthcare 
overhaul). 
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it should be regarded like any other type of delegation by Congress to agencies.28 
Perhaps the most fertile legal consideration invoked in recent debates involves 
various forms of hypothetical “conditional” waivers, whereby the agency waives 
some statutory requirement conditional on a state taking some other putatively 
voluntary action.29 This form of conditional waiver may be unconstitutional if, 
for example, the condition is unrelated to the purposes of the federal program 
in question. However, it is not entirely clear why unconstitutional conditions 
relate uniquely to waivers rather than to delegations of discretionary authority 
more generally. Presumably such conditions might attach in relation either to 
the discretionary imposition of a requirement — do X or we do Y — or the 
discretionary waiver of a requirement — do X and we undo Y.30
Perhaps as a result of this basic equivalence, most of the criticism of 
waivers comes in various forms of policy or value-based concerns. For 
instance, some fear that the federal government might abuse waiver authority 
to the detriment of state autonomy or other rule of law values.31 However, 
again, it is not entirely clear that this concern is specific to waivers; much the 
same might be said of the exercise of any discretionary authority, whether 
positive, as is usually the case, or negative, as is the case for waivers. More 
uniquely related to waivers, others express concern that waivers will allow 
agencies, over time, to “disappear” a statute.32 Although statutes often place 
limits on the substantive and temporal scope of agencies’ waiver authority, 
agencies may undermine these limits by, for example, repeatedly granting 
28 David J. Baron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. l. 
rev. 265 (2013); Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative Authority: 
Constitutional and Rule-of-Law Arguments Over Nonenforcement and Waiver, 
8 J. legAl AnAl. 235 (2016); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 
125 yAle l.J. 1548 (2016).
29 Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver, 68 vAnd. l. rev. 607 
(2015); Price, supra note 28.
30 Of course, to the extent that one argues that agencies should not have any 
discretionary authority, this would equally affect both positive and negative 
types of actions; my point is that one must seemingly attack that rather larger 
issue to come out against waivers.
31 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 9 (summarizing policy concerns on the right 
and left about waivers); Richard A. Epstein, The Perilous Position of the Rule 
of Law and the Administrative State, 36 hArv. J.l. & Pub. Pol’y 5 (2013).
32 Jonathan R. Bolton, The Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy 
Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the Medicaid Program, 
37 Colum. J.l. & SoC. ProbS. 91 (2004).
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extensions of waivers.33 At least in the limit, this is undoubtedly a serious 
concern regarding waivers.
Though not dismissing such policy-based concerns, most observers evaluate 
waivers against the backdrop of crippling legislative gridlock. In this context, 
waivers seem a welcome relief: they permit play in the policymaking joints, 
allowing states and administrative agencies to tailor and adapt policy to changing 
circumstances. On this comparative basis, many scholars defend, even if not 
quite cheer, the rise of waivers as a method of policymaking. Perhaps most 
prominently, in an article aptly titled In Defense of Big Waivers, Barron and 
Rakoff argue that waivers represent “an institutional innovation that makes 
possible lawmaking for the sake of the general welfare that would simply be 
impossible or impracticable otherwise.”34 Bagenstos, similarly, recognizes 
the common critiques of waivers, but concludes on balance with a relatively 
“optimistic view of federalism by waiver.”35 At least given congressional 
gridlock, Bulman-Pozen, likewise, argues the “affirmative case for executive 
federalism,” that is, waiver-like activity, in part because it “offers new routes 
to bipartisan compromise and negotiation that seem out of reach of Congress.”36
As a window into this debate, I focus on Medicaid implementation for 
most of this Article. Consistent with the view that waivers permit play in the 
policymaking joints, they have facilitated a range of programmatic policy 
innovations over the years in this area. During the 1990s, for example, many 
states received waivers allowing them to use federal funds for managed care 
programs.37 Even more programmatically, Massachusetts’s universal healthcare 
plan — the model for the ACA — emerged in important part through waivers 
that permitted the state to apply funds to broader categories of the population, 
and to shift funds between programs.38 However, waivers have also been 
used in ways that arguably undermine beneficiaries, imposing cost-sharing 
33 For example, Arkansas, which received a waiver for Medicaid expansion in 
2014, is preparing to apply for an extension of its waiver. See State of Ark., 
Waiver Extension Application (2017) (on file with author).
34 Barron & Rakoff, supra note 10, at 340. 
35 Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 9. 
36 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 13, at 33-34; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From 
Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American 
Federalism, 123 yAle l.J. 1920, 1945 (2014) (“Especially compared to unilateral 
executive action, big waiver to states fosters transparency, accountability, and 
political debate . . . .”); Metzger, supra note 14, at 1744 (arguing that waivers and 
other state-agency partnerships can “open[] up opportunities for bipartisanship”). 
37 Smith & Moore, supra note 26, at 266-71.
38 See, e.g., AliSon mitChell, Cong. reSeArCh Serv. rl42865, mediCAid 
diSProPortionAte ShAre hoSPitAl PAymentS (2013).
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requirements, for example, that have been shown to discourage lower-income 
individuals from participating in the healthcare program.39 Thus, even as waivers 
open the door to beneficial compromises and experimentalism, they also invite 
ideological program retrenchment and cost containment.40 Moreover, these 
retrenchments often come in the “guise” of experimentalism and welcomed 
policy innovation,41 a feature of waivers discussed in detail below.42
Perhaps the most prominent recent example of waivers involves the ACA, 
a running example for this Article.43 As a result of the Court’s NFIB decision,44 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions — which would expand Medicaid 
eligibility up to 138% of the federal poverty level — did not apply unless 
the state agreed to it. As originally written, the expansion would be folded 
into existing Medicaid programs, and states’ choice would be either to accept 
the expansion, or to withdraw from the Medicaid program in its entirety; the 
Court’s decision permits states discretion with respect to the expansion itself. 
Along with the decision over whether to set up a state-based exchange, this 
expansion decision represents one of the main areas of state discretion with 
respect to the ACA. This means that it was also one of the main areas over 
which state leaders could demonstrate acquiescence or defiance to the ACA, 
and by extension to President Obama, endowing the decision with a great 
deal of political importance, particularly among Republicans. 
39 See, e.g., WiShner et Al., supra note 6.
40 For a similar observation of this trend, though in the context of AFDC, see 
PeterSon, supra note 16, at 109 (noting that though opportunities to experiment 
may “seem[] in principle to allow for experimentation in either a more liberal 
or a more restrictive direction, the proposals for waiver of federal requirements 
approved by the Department of Health and Human Services have almost always 
had a conservative cast”).
41 Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and 
Welfare “Reform,” 26 u. miCh. J.l. reForm 741, 745 (1993) (“[A]spects of 
some of the state [welfare] reform projects appear merely to be attempts to 
reduce benefits under the guise of experimentation.”).
42 For a powerful criticism of “democratic experimentalism,” see David A. Super, 
Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of 
Antipoverty Law, 157 u. PA. l. rev. 541 (2008).
43 Section 10201(i) of the ACA imposed some new procedural requirements 
waivers, such that they now must be more transparent and undergo a process 
resembling notice and comment. This procedural reform responds to a consistent 
criticism that waiver negotiations between states and federal bureaucrats take 
place under opaque conditions, with little input from the would-be beneficiaries. 
Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act, Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119, § 1020(i) (2010).
44 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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The decision to expand follows predictable partisan contours. To date, 
thirty-one states have decided to adopt the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.45 The 
mean 2008 Obama vote share in these states was 55.3 percentage points, and 
most of these states — twenty-three of them — had a majority of the population 
supporting Obama in the election. By comparison, the mean 2008 Obama 
vote share in the states that have decided not to expand was 44.5 percentage 
points, and majorities in nearly all of these states — fifteen of nineteen — 
sided with Senator McCain in the 2008 election.46
Of the thirty-one states that have elected to expand Medicaid, seven did 
so only after the CMS gave them a waiver.47 These waivers have tended to 
make the Medicaid program more palatable to conservative constituents in two 
primary ways. The first involves using Medicaid funding to allow beneficiaries 
to buy private insurance on the state’s exchange — the so-called “private 
option.” The second involves imposing a set of “personal responsibility” 
requirements on beneficiaries: for example, premium-like payments, including 
controversially a lockout period in the event of nonpayment, cost-sharing 
provisions, or mandatory contributions to health savings accounts.48 The CMS 
has also rejected a number of highly controversial waiver applications, most 
notably proposals by Indiana and Pennsylvania to tie Medicaid benefits to 
whether the beneficiary was working or searching for work.49 I consider the 
legal dimension of such waivers toward the end of the Article, but for now 
note that the standard view is that waivers created enough space between the 
leaders of the implementing state and the ACA to make Medicaid expansion 
acceptable for a range of states. Of course, whether they would have expanded 
in any event is a critical question, interrogated later in this Article.50
45 As of September 1, 2015. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion 





48 WiShner et Al., supra note 6.
49 Id.
50 The states that have expanded through waiver tend ideologically to be somewhere 
between those that unconditionally expand and those that unconditionally decline 
to expand. The mean 2008 Obama vote share in these waiver states is 50.8 
percentage points, almost six percentage points higher than the corresponding 
figure for those that have declined to expand, and almost six percentage points 
lower than the corresponding figure for those that unconditionally expanded. For 
states’ expansion status, see supra note 45 and accompanying text; for Obama 
vote shares, see, for example, Federal Elections 2008, Fed. eleCtion Comm’n, 
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II. state PolItIcs and safety net ImPlementatIon
Although the flexibility afforded by waivers might, in principle, lead to either 
more liberal or more conservative policies, I argue that, in general, flexibility 
conjoined with the forces of state politics leads to a predicable conservative 
trend in policy implementation. A number of factors make it likely that states 
will seek waivers that reduce benefits in various ways.
A. Jurisdictional Competition
The longstanding concern among those who study welfare provision in 
the United States is that competition between states will depress benefit 
levels.51 The logic of this theory of jurisdictional competition is simple and 
compelling: more generous benefits attract more beneficiaries, resulting in 
tax burdens that eventually induce capital and labor flight and undermine the 
state economy. Seeking to avoid this outcome, states engage in a “race to the 
bottom,” undercutting benefits relative to other states.
Let us be clear that the empirical support for this theory is mixed. As a 
preliminary matter, it is not clear that the migratory mechanism operates as 
suggested. Much evidence suggests that inter-state migration is relatively 
infrequent, and that when people move they think primarily of employment 
and housing opportunities rather than benefits levels.52 Supporting this idea, a 
recent study found that the Medicaid expansion states did not experience high 
in-migration relative to states that did not expand Medicaid — this despite 
massive differences in benefits between the two sets of states.53 Indeed, the 
fact that a major policy concern is benefit take-up — that is, subscribing to 
benefits within current jurisdictions — further substantiates the idea that the 
migratory patterns of the relevant population may be fairly insensitive to 
benefits levels.54 The proposed mechanism, therefore, is somewhat dubious.
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.shtml (last visited Jan. 
10, 2017). 
51 See, e.g., PeterSon, supra note 16. 
52 Robert E.B. Lucas, Internal Migration in Developed Countries, in hAndbooK 
oF PoPulAtion And FAmily eConomiCS 647 (Mark R. Rosenzweig & Oded Stark 
eds., 1997).
53 Aaron L. Schwartz & Benjamin D. Sommers, Moving for Medicaid? Recent 
Eligibility Expansions Did Not Induce Migration from Other States, 33 heAlth 
AFF. 88 (2014); see also Jonah B. Gelbach, Migration, the Life Cycle, and State 
Benefits: How Low Is the Bottom?, 112 J. Pol. eCon. 1091 (2004).
54 Anna Aizer, Low Take-Up in Medicaid: Does Outreach Matter and for Whom?, 
93 Am. eCon. rev. 238 (2003).
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Studies of policy outcomes also introduce doubt. The typical approach 
to studying the race to the bottom hypothesis is to examine the sensitivity 
of benefits levels of a given state to the benefits levels of surrounding states, 
usually lagged by some interval. Some studies find evidence of such sensitivity,55 
but others do not.56 This inconsistent pattern may be owing to differences in 
the programs studied, or to the challenge of selecting the correct policy lag, 
or to differences in the timing of the studies. In any event, the conclusion 
that does emerge from this literature is that there is no strong and consistent 
evidence that states are sensitive to safety net policies of neighboring states.
Notwithstanding the generally mixed evidence, it is impossible to deny 
that some features of states’ policies appear to have been designed to forestall 
in-migration. For example, California restricted welfare benefits for new 
migrants. The plain purpose of this provision was to discourage those who 
would move to generous states, such as California, for the welfare benefits 
— or give the appearance of attempting to do so. The Supreme Court later 
invalidated this policy as a violation of the right to travel in Saenz v. Roe.57
One explanation for the structure of such policies is that politicians are 
extremely sensitive to the charge that they have opened the door to the 
state becoming a so-called welfare magnet. That is, even if in-migration 
is fundamentally not a concern, due for example to frictions of residential 
mobility, and is unlikely to notably increase tax burdens or result in capital or 
labor flight, even modest levels of in-migration may have important political 
consequences. The political opposition may, for instance, express increases 
in the welfare population in percentage terms, or in terms of the number of 
additional dollars spent in aggregate, a number that is sure to sound large to 
voters, even if it is small as a fraction of government revenue. So framed, 
it is possible that the political consequences of safety net programs outstrip 
their fiscal consequences, leading in any event to much the same outcome — 
seeming fears of in-migration and a diminution of the safety net.
55 See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey & Mark Carl Rom, A Wider Race? Interstate 
Competition Across Health and Welfare Programs, 66 J. Pol. 326 (2004).
56 See, e.g., William D. Berry et al., Reassessing the “Race to the Bottom” in State 
Welfare Policy, 65 J. Pol. 327 (2003); Frank H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, 
Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, 5 SuP. Ct. eCon. rev. 141 (1997); 
Craig Volden, The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom 
in Welfare Benefits?, 46 Am. J. Pol. SCi. 352 (2002); Thomas Gais & R. Kent 
Weaver, State Policy Choices Under Welfare Reform (Brookings Policy Brief 
No. 21, 2002).
57 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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B. State Budget Pressures
A second way in which state political forces may undermine safety net programs 
through waiver relates to budget pressures. It is plain that safety nets have the 
most use in economic downturns, as people lose jobs or otherwise experience 
reduced incomes.58 But these same forces naturally also work against state 
budget health in two ways: the decline in economic activity reduces state tax 
revenue, and state programs — safety net programs in particular — experience 
higher demand. So the states face the strongest budget pressure to control 
spending and decrease services at precisely the time that safety nets have the 
most value in blunting poverty and inequality.
All governments face this basic problem, but the issue is particularly acute 
for state governments. Part of the problem for states plausibly relates to the 
issue above — a limited ability to tax residents due to concerns of jurisdictional 
competition. A dramatic increase in taxes designed to accommodate an expansion 
of social services may, over time, induce flight to other states with lower tax 
burdens. However, state governments also arguably face at least three further 
related problems that the federal government does not. First, as non-issuers, 
states cannot adapt monetary policy to changing economic conditions. Second, 
most states have restrictions on governments’ spending or revenue-raising 
ability,59 and much the same is true of their ability to borrow.60 Such provisions 
likely constrain the ability of governments to expand social services in times 
of economic downturn. Third, even absent these legal considerations, states 
face higher borrowing costs than the federal government.61 Higher borrowing 
58 Micah Hartman et al., National Health Spending in 2011: Overall Growth 
Remains Low, But Some Payers and Services Show Signs of Acceleration, 32 
heAlth AFF. 87 (2013).
59 A 2010 survey by the National Conference of State Legislatures found that 
four states had revenue restrictions, twenty-three had spending restrictions, and 
three had some combination of the two types of restrictions. Over half of these 
restrictions are constitutional rather than statutory. See State Tax and Expenditure 
Limits — 2010, nAt’l ConFerenCe oF StAte legiSlAtion, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/fiscal-policy/state-tax-and-expenditure-limits-2010.aspx (last visited 
July 28, 2016). 
60 JAmeS m. PoterbA & Kim S. rueben, Pub. Pol’y inSt. oF CA., FiSCAl ruleS And 
StAte borroWing CoStS: evidenCe From CAliForniA And other StAteS (1999).
61 For instance, in March 2013, California issued ten-year bonds at a yield of 2.56%, 
whereas the U.S. Treasury issued ten-year bonds at a yield of 1.96%. Long-Term 
Government Bond Yields: 10-year: Main (Including Benchmark) for the United States, 
Fred eCon. dAtA, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/IRLTLT01USM156N 
(last visited July 28, 2016). This difference reflects investors’ judgments about 
the credit worthiness of the different government actors.
2017] Forces of Federalism, Safety Nets, and Waivers 139
costs, likewise, make it more difficult for state governments to implement 
effective counter-cyclical policies.
Supporting this view, states’ policies appear to exhibit sensitivity to 
economic downturns, reflecting these budget pressures. A recent report by 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicates that only seven states 
decreased Medicaid benefits levels in 2008, before they could have adapted 
to the Great Recession. As the recession hit, the same report reveals, the 
number of states decreasing Medicaid benefits levels increased to twenty in 
2009, twenty-four in 2010, and eighteen in 2011.62 Moreover, during this same 
period, the federal government expanded fiscal programs, including assistance 
to states — though evidently not at a level to forestall programmatic state 
cuts. Although states do not necessarily need to apply for waivers to decrease 
benefits levels, a permissive posture on waivers creates the possibility of 
amplified policy responses to the business cycle that counter the purpose of 
the safety net program. 
III. agency-state BargaInIng
So far, I have argued that a permissive posture on waivers favors a form of 
devolution that in theory encourages generally retrenching forces of state 
implementation. This first point interacts with a second, which is that waivers, 
if permissive, undermine the bargaining position of the federal agency. As I 
have observed, waivers represent a forum for negotiation between the state 
and some federal agency. Often, these parties will want different policies: 
the federal agency, for instance, may view itself as the steward of the statute, 
wishing to see full implementation of the statutory provisions; the state, by 
contrast, may be subject to the forces described above, seeking to under-
implement the statute in one way or another. The waiver application is a 
forum for bargaining over these differences.63
62 u.S. gov’t ACCountAbility oFFiCe, mediCAid: StAteS mAde multiPle ProgrAm 
ChAngeS, And beneFiCiArieS generAlly rePorted ACCeSS ComPArAble to PrivAte 
inSurAnCe 18 (2012).
63 Although we might imagine the opposite configuration — with the federal agency 
wishing to see under-implementation, and the state full implementation — this 
is less likely for two primary reasons. First, it is unlikely that the state requires 
a waiver to see full implementation; if the state simply wishes to implement the 
full terms of the statute, that is, it need not request a waiver from the relevant 
agency. Second, as argued above, the forces of state implementation generally 
lean toward limiting benefits or eligibility.
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A. The Problem
In the service of obtaining a waiver, a standard argument that a conservative 
state might make is that, given some feature of state politics or finances, 
it needs the waiver to implement (or continue to implement) any version 
of the policy. For example, states often declare that a waiver is necessary 
given budget pressures.64 State posturing around Medicaid expansion under 
the ACA represents a clear example of this type of dynamic: conservative 
state administrations have argued that, without a waiver admitting of some 
personal responsibility requirement, it is politically impossible to move 
expansion through the relevant state institution; the legislature, for instance, 
will balk at the notion of expanding Medicaid absent the waiver.65 This may 
or may not be true. However, the federal agency, the CMS in this case, has a 
poor read on whether it is true, and in this sense the bargaining occurs in an 
environment of incomplete information. 
The fact that the waiver application is a forum for agency-state bargaining 
is nearly self-evident, but this point about information has virtually escaped 
attention in the literature. Scholars have gestured to the issue: for example, 
Suzan Bennett and Kathleen Sullivan observe that many state welfare reforms, 
also proceeding through waivers, “appear merely to be attempts to reduce 
benefits under the guise of experimentation.”66 Yet the problem is fundamental 
to the institution of waivers. Despite being experts in their policy areas, federal 
bureaucrats face severe information problems with respect to states: critically, 
they do not know the realities of state politics, and they do not understand 
state budgets. This means that when a state says that it needs a waiver to 
implement a federal policy — due to state politics or budget issues — the 
federal agency will not easily be able to determine the truthfulness of the 
statement. The state may, in fact, need the waiver; but it is also possible that 
the state is pursuing the waiver for gratuitous ideological reasons, unrelated to 
feasibility. In this context, the posture agencies adopt with respect to waiver 
applications is critical. I present a simple model reflecting this argument in 
the Article’s Appendix.
64 See, e.g., Wood v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 836 (D. Ariz. 2013).
65 See infra Section III.B.
66 Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 41, at 745. 
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B. Bargaining Example
As an illustration of the type of bargaining that might take place in this waiver 
context, consider Pennsylvania’s application for its Medicaid expansion waiver.67 
There, the state argued that “to provide quality, affordable health care services 
to Pennsylvania’s most vulnerable citizens, Pennsylvania must transform its 
Medicaid program,” noting that the program “requires substantial new state 
revenue on an ongoing basis,” and that it places a “burden on the taxpayers” 
and makes it “difficult to fund other critical program areas, such as education.”68 
According to the application, the state wished to continue “its pursuit of 
innovative reforms”69 through the waiver, principally by using Medicaid 
funds to provide premium assistance for private insurance (i.e., the “private 
option”), and by imposing various personal responsibility requirements on 
beneficiaries.70 With respect to personal responsibility, the waiver application 
most controversially included an “encouraging employment program,” which 
made employment or participation in a job-training program a condition for 
receiving Medicaid benefits.71 But it also proposed that beneficiaries pay 
premiums, and included a “lockout” period of up to nine months for those who 
failed to pay.72 These and other concessions, the state maintained, represented 
“[p]rogram innovations and reforms [that] are necessary to improve health 
outcomes and ensure sustainability so that an adequate and appropriate health 
care safety net can be provided for those who need it.”73
This waiver application thus fits the basic mold: a request to privatize, reduce 
benefits, or require cost sharing, along with a gloss of program “innovation,” 
combined with ominous references to program sustainability and other budget 
priorities. The looming implicit feature of this application was Republican 
control of both the governor’s office and state legislature, and the threat that 
the state would not expand Medicaid under the ACA absent some concessions.74 
The validity of these threats was difficult to discern: was the budget truly 
67 Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Healthy Pennsylvania 1115 Demonstration Application 
(2013) (on file with author).
68 Id. at 10.
69 Id. at 5.
70 E.g., id. at 13-14.
71 Id. at 13.
72 Id. at 90.
73 Id. at 6.
74 See, e.g., WiShner et Al., supra note 6, at 13 (noting that the governor “initially 
faced significant opposition in the legislature but eventually was able to garner 
the support he needed [for Medicaid expansion]. He framed the plan as a ‘private 
coverage option.’”). 
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imperiled and was program sustainability in question? If the CMS plays 
hardball, refusing concessions, would the state fold and expand Medicaid? 
The state, of course, was in a much better position than the CMS to know 
the details of the state budget, as well as the personalities and preferences of 
the relevant local political figures.
Though CMS disapproved of the most controversial components of 
Pennsylvania’s application — notably, the employment condition and the 
lockout period — it largely approved the fundamentals of the proposal, 
freeing the state to pursue its version of the “private option” and allowing 
it to require premiums of beneficiaries.75 Most observers view the waiver 
in a positive light; this represents an example of the sort of sorely needed 
pragmatic bipartisan deal-making that waivers facilitate. Nevertheless, the 
question presses — were the concessions necessary to win Medicaid expansion 
in Pennsylvania? Did the budget in fact require the sort of “innovations” 
contained in the application?
Even in hindsight, these questions remain fraught and uncertain — indeed, 
that is the nature of the type of informational problem agencies confront. Yet 
we have at least some strong suggestive evidence that the application played 
up the problems posed by the standard Medicaid package. Less than a year 
after Pennsylvania submitted its waiver application, a Democrat, Tom Wolf, 
won the governorship. Soon after taking office, he produced a timeline for 
rolling back the waiver and implementing a traditional Medicaid program. 
The transition to traditional Medicaid was completed in fall 2015.76 Though 
not conclusive — perhaps this traditional expansion foretells some future 
budgetary calamity — it at least suggests that the application overstated its 
concerns about program sustainability. It also undermines the thesis that state 
politics could not support expansion under a traditional Medicaid package.
C. Bargaining Discussion
Though simple, the recognition of this problem provides insight into several 
important features of waivers and state-agency interactions. The initial 
75 For a comparison of the submitted and approved plans, see Joe Markosek, House 
Appropriations Comm., Gov. Corbett’s Healthy PA Submitted vs. Approved Plan, 
PAhouSe.Com (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.pahouse.com/Files/Documents/
Appropriations/series/2817/DPW_HealthyPA_Comparison_FF_091014.pdf.
76 See, e.g., Damon C. Williams, State Completes Technical Aspect of Medicaid 
Expansion, PhilA. trib., Sept. 11, 2015, http://www.phillytrib.com/news/state-
completes-technical-aspect-of-medicaid-expansion/article_7fba4d5e-1f4d-5109-
87c7-f1e0c1e8c7e6.html.
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observation is in line with the existing literature: waivers can be helpful, 
both for states and for the federal government. For example, as explained 
above, and further discussed in the Appendix, the question in the context of 
the ACA and Medicaid expansion is whether waivers permit conservative 
states to expand Medicaid when they otherwise would not do so for political or 
budgetary reasons. If properly calibrated, waivers can filter out the states that 
require waivers to expand from those that do not, improving outcomes for all 
involved. However, the problem extends beyond the ACA and characterizes 
bargaining dynamics when the states and agencies have different preferences 
— as will often be the case — and the states enjoy an information advantage 
over some relevant characteristic of the proposal — as again will often be 
the case. For example, again if properly calibrated, waivers might filter out 
those states that seek to cut benefits for ideological reasons from those that 
seek to improve safety net delivery.77
As a corollary, however, waivers can at times be distinctly unhelpful if not 
properly calibrated, a point not sufficiently integrated into this recent literature 
on waivers. If the government’s posture toward waivers is too permissive, it 
encourages states to misrepresent their intentions — to say they are “innovating” 
in some relevant respect, but in reality to retrench safety net programs or 
pursue ideological ends. This process is likely to be encouraged by — and to 
encourage — forces operating at the state level that generally work against 
robust safety nets. Moreover, this occurs even if the federal government is a 
“good actor,” doing its best to approve only the appropriate waivers. It results 
not from agency malfeasance or sabotage, but from underlying problems of 
information; the states have much better information about their proposals and 
the relevant local political and economic factors than the federal government; 
at least under a permissive waiver regime, this allows the states to sometimes 
pull one over on the federal government. 
77 To more fully explain the mapping to this scenario, in the Appendix, the federal 
agency does not know how the proposal will play out in the state; say, w now 
reflects whether the waiver will improve delivery or simply eliminate benefits, 
which depends on difficult-to-observe state-level factors. The federal agency 
only wishes to grant the waiver if the state conditions support improved delivery: 
granting the waiver to a benefit-cutting state results in less than ideal policy, and 
denying a waiver to an innovating state also results in less than ideal policy, as 
the need for innovation may be spurred by changes in the state that make the 
“standard” policy inadequate. However, the agency does not observe whether 
the state conditions reflect cost-cutting incentives or innovating incentives, and 
the states themselves always reference the flexibility afforded by the waiver (but 
for different reasons). This gives rise to essentially the same analysis, as shown 
above and in the Appendix, which is targeted to the expansion waiver context. 
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Another straightforward corollary is that complete opposition to waivers — 
perhaps on the grounds of national uniformity — is also not the most fruitful 
approach. This restrictive approach neglects the underlying heterogeneity 
in state conditions that, at times, call for tailored solutions through waivers. 
Failing to tailor in this fashion, as suggested above, may result in policy that 
is worse for both the state and the federal agency, not to mention beneficiaries. 
The critical question, then, is how to calibrate waivers so that they encourage 
requests from the “right” kinds of states and not from the “wrong” kinds of 
states. I now consider this issue of calibration. 
Iv. managIng WaIvers
Waivers represent not simple devolution, but instead managed devolution. 
They are managed in two important respects. First, the relevant federal 
agency must approve the waiver. The way in which agencies manage waivers 
— demanding more or less from applications — represents an important 
management device, as suggested above. I discuss administrative procedures 
that might be helpful at the agency level in Section A below, but agency-
level management is of limited value if an agency is politically committed 
to a loose waiver regime or the consequent policy outcomes. For instance, 
though the Obama administration rejected Pennsylvania’s request to condition 
Medicaid benefits on employment or job training, it is easy to imagine other 
administrations endorsing or even encouraging such innovations. Indeed, 
when Vice President Pence was Governor of Indiana, the state proposed a 
similar work requirement (also rejected by the Obama Administration).78 This 
stresses the question of what the limits on waivers might be. Our response 
to this question turns on the second form of management — judicial review, 
which is discussed in Section B. 
A. Administrative Procedures
The basic objective of administrative procedures in this context is twofold: 
first, to help agencies overcome informational problems, particularly as 
relates to the states; and second, to help courts conduct meaningful review 
of agency actions.
Recently, Congress has taken important steps to improve the procedures 
surrounding waivers — at least, Section 1115 demonstration waivers, which 
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historically have perhaps been viewed as the most potent form of waivers.79 
Section 10201(i) of the ACA amended Section 1115 of the Social Security 
Act to require agencies to promulgate regulations that provide for notice-and-
comment type procedures at both the state and federal levels for most waivers. 
The Department of Health and Human Services — the parent agency of the 
CMS — issued such regulations on February 27, 2012.80 At the state level, 
the regulations provide minimum transparency requirements: states must give 
notice of the waiver application on their website, as well as the state register 
or in state newspapers; must allow at least thirty days for public commenting; 
and must hold at least two public hearings.81 Once the CMS has received 
the application, the agency, likewise, must give notice of the application by 
posting it on its website, and notifying parties through list-serves or the like; 
allow at least thirty days for public commenting; wait at least forty-five days 
from the date of receipt before approving the application; and maintain an 
administrative record on its website.82
These procedures undoubtedly ameliorate both of the relevant problems: they 
help level information all around, making agencies more the equal of states, 
and courts more the equal of agencies. Still, they represent a sort of notice-and-
comment “lite,” and they might be further strengthened in a number of ways.83 
Most relevant, they do not sufficiently force the state and federal agencies to 
consider and justify the merits of the application, thereby diminishing both 
the deliberative benefits afforded by procedures as well as the ability of courts 
to conduct meaningful review. For example, the regulations require the state 
to give public notice only thirty days before submission,84 and it is unclear 
how seriously the state agency must take any comments it receives during this 
short window.85 The procedures at the federal level seem, if anything, even 
more slapdash on this deliberative dimension. Again, as at the state level, the 
deliberative window between the end of the comment period and earliest date 
of approval is vanishingly short, fifteen days.86 Even more disturbing, at the 
79 See supra note 25.
80 Review and Approval Process for Section 1115 Demonstrations, 77 Fed. Reg. 
11,678 (2012).
81 Id., codified at 42 C.F.R. § 431.408.
82 Id., codified at 42 C.F.R. § 431.416.
83 Here, I refer to the procedures for ordinary rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553.
84 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(A)(2)(ii). 
85 42 C.F.R. § 431.412(a)(1)(viii) provides that, for initial projects, the state 
must include a “report of the issues raised by the public during the comment 
period . . . and how the state considered those comments when developing the 
demonstration application.” 
86 The agency must wait forty-five days from the time the application is received, 
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federal level, is that the agency disavows any duty to address issues raised 
in comments: “CMS will review and consider all comments received by the 
deadline,” the regulations reassure, “but will not provide written responses 
to public comments.”87 The agency is, of course, less likely to take comments 
seriously if it does not have to provide responses to them.
B. Judicial Review
The case law on waivers is, as yet, fairly thin, particularly post-ACA reforms.88 
As an illustration of how judicial review might falter in the face of weak 
administrative procedures, though, consider the recent case of Wood v. Betlach.89 
The case suggests the ways in which more searching scrutiny of waiver 
approvals might induce state actors to promote statutory objectives. 
By way of background, in 2011, the Secretary approved a waiver application 
from Arizona seeking to impose higher copayments on a segment of beneficiaries.90 
42 C.F.R. § 431.416(e)(1), but is taking comments for thirty of those days, 42 
C.F.R. § 431.416(b).
87 42 C.F.R. 431.416(d).
88 An early case, often cited for the view that courts deferentially review waivers, 
is Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1973), dealing with the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was subject to the 
same demonstration project waiver provision as Medicaid. It involved the question 
of whether the then-operative agency, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW), could grant a waiver to New York that conditioned welfare 
benefits on a work requirement. Several would-be beneficiaries argued, among 
other things, that the waiver was contrary to the relevant statute; the Secretary 
disagreed. The court deferred to the agency and rejected the challenge to the 
waiver. In so doing, Judge Friendly, writing for the panel, nodded to the political 
issues involved in this case, noting that the Secretary may 
properly take into account the growing antagonism to the welfare system 
and the possibility that, unless the public is satisfied that every reasonable 
effort is being made to induce employable recipients of assistance to 
work, pressure on governors and legislatures . . . [might cause additional 
curtailment in benefits] . . . with far greater ultimate hardship than these 
[waiver-facilitated] projects may entail.
 Id. at 1103. This political argument — which relied on the state’s representation 
of the political environment and presumably informed the subsequent deferential 
statutory analysis — is strikingly similar to the arguments now advanced in 
favor of granting waivers to states.
89 Wood v. Betlach, No. CV-12-08098-PCT-DGC (D. Ariz. July 26, 2013); Wood 
v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 836 (D. Ariz. 2013).
90 These higher payments applied to the expansion population consisting of 
beneficiaries that states may optionally cover under the Medicaid program. 
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The beneficiaries who would be subject to these higher copayments sought 
an injunction against the waiver. Initially, the court approved some aspects 
of the waiver, and found others wanting under arbitrariness review.91 The 
court remanded without vacatur, and on remand the Secretary reaffirmed her 
decision. Following this agency action, the plaintiffs challenged again, and 
the court granted summary judgment to the Secretary.92
On review, focus tends toward two questions: first, whether the agency 
had the statutory authority to approve the waiver; and, second, whether the 
agency behaved arbitrarily in granting a waiver. Post ACA, a third question 
seems likely to become more important, that is, whether the waiver was granted 
consistently with the agency’s self-generated procedural requirements.93 This 
third question, however, is not relevant to this case, as it arrives before the 
ACA reforms.
i. Statutory Authority
On the statutory question, permissibility turns on the particulars of the relevant 
granted waiver and waiver authority. At least in the context of Section 1115 
waivers, the statutory analysis is largely guided by the requirement that, for 
the Secretary to grant a waiver request, the requested waiver must “in the 
judgment of the Secretary, [be] likely to assist in promoting the objectives of 
[the Act].”94 Notice that this language somewhat limits courts’ ability to review 
the substance of the agency’s decision, and so the operative question courts 
have examined is how searching the Secretary’s assessment of the issue was. 
With respect to the objectives of Medicaid, the Social Security Act provides 
that the purpose of the program is, in part, “to furnish . . . medical assistance 
on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled 
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs 
of necessary medical services.”95 This objective clearly admits a large zone 
91 Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d.
92 Betlach, No. CV-12-08098-PCT-DGC.
93 E.g., 42 C.F.R. § 431.416.
94 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2014). In fact, courts have articulated 
what amounts to a three-prong analysis of waivers, asking whether the Secretary 
examined: (1) whether the waiver had an experimental or demonstration 
component; (2) whether the waiver was likely to promote the objectives of the 
act; and (3) the extent and period necessary for the project. See Beno v. Shalala, 
30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370 (9th 
Cir. 2011). This Article focuses on the second of these prongs, as it is probably 
the most far-reaching potential management vehicle.
95 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1.
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of discretion. For example, a waiver might expand eligibility to new people, 
but at the cost of reduced benefits for those already covered by the program. 
The statute does not seem to speak to this tradeoff. 
In Betlach, the court tripped over this statutory question — if a waiver, on 
the whole, promotes the objectives of the act, is that enough? Or must every 
component of a waiver promote its objectives? Or is there some third way 
of construing the issue? This is a challenging and important set of questions, 
but the Betlach court took the essentially conclusory view that “[it] is not 
persuaded that copayments challenged as part of a larger demonstration project 
must independently merit approval under Section 1115.”96 The court reasoned 
that “[t]o so hold would mean that any provision of a larger demonstration 
project could be challenged as not independently warranting approval under 
Section 1115, notwithstanding that provision’s relationship to and interaction 
with the project as a whole.”97 To be fair, I am not aware of any court that 
considered the issue in more detail than this.
But clearly, on the one hand, requiring each component independently 
to meet the relevant criteria is likely to defeat virtually any waiver request 
that involves tradeoffs, for example, lower benefits for expanded eligibility. 
This seems to be the animating concern in Betlach. Still, on the other hand, 
permitting the Secretary to consider the waiver program as a whole invites 
states to attach unnecessary ideological, retrenching, or political “riders” to 
applications that otherwise promote the Act’s objectives. Allowing the Secretary 
to examine merely the question of whether the waiver would, considered as a 
whole, promote the Act’s objectives plainly encourages state gamesmanship 
that itself runs contrary to the Act. This perspective received no airing in the 
Betlach court’s opinion.
I want to suggest that one need not accept either the component-by-
component perspective or the as-a-whole perspective. Consider the possibility 
that the Secretary, and therefore the courts on review, engages in a sort of 
“severability” analysis.98 The relevant question, then, in this analysis is whether 
the component inconsistent with the Act’s objectives may be severed without 
undermining the other features of the request. Sometimes the contrary feature 
96 Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
97 Id.
98 In the statutory context, see, for example, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 
678, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). For a recent article considering the administrative 
context, see Charles W. Tyler & Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability 
Clauses, 124 yAle l.J. 2286 (2015) (calling for courts to defer to agencies’ 
views regarding severability; note that the present context differs in that it seeks 
to have agencies conduct a severability analysis themselves of states’ proposals). 
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is necessary to buy the promoting features; but at other times it will not be. 
Absent such an analysis, at least on important components of the request, the 
Secretary’s approval of the waiver should be deemed arbitrary and capricious.
This sort of analysis was entirely absent from the Betlach decision, but 
it would have led to a different outcome, as the Secretary apparently did not 
engage in the inquiry.99 Moreover, substantively, it is likely that the Secretary 
would have been forced to conclude that the relevant copayment provision 
was severable. The state justified the copayments by arguing that they were 
necessary to contain costs and ensure the sustainability of coverage for the 
relevant segment of the population. If copayments were in fact necessary to 
ensure program sustainability, they would not be severable; but if they were 
not, then they should be severed and considered independently. 
Most research suggests that, at least for Medicaid beneficiaries, copayments 
alter behavior but do not reduce state expenditures.100 A study of a program 
affecting a population similar to Medicaid beneficiaries in Quebec found that 
requiring copayments for prescription drugs reduced use of prescription drugs, 
but also led to higher use of hospitals and emergency rooms;101 similarly, a 
study of Oregon’s experience with copayments for Medicaid beneficiaries 
found that they led to decreases in some services, such as prescription drugs, 
but increases in others, such as inpatient care, with, on average, no change in 
expenditures per beneficiary.102 These studies indicate that the copayments rule 
99 In her initial decision, the Secretary did not consider the argument that copayments 
do not reduce expenditures, and this failing, in part, led to the remand (without 
vacatur) in Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 850. However, this took place in the 
generic setting of arbitrariness review, examining whether the Secretary considered 
evidence presented during administrative proceedings. On remand, the Secretary 
approved the original waiver application, and this time in her approval letter 
“reference[d] these objections and conclude[d] otherwise.” Wood v. Betlach, 
No. CV-12-08098-PCT-DGC (D. Ariz. July 26, 2013). Of course, this cursory 
analysis by the Secretary, as conveyed by the reviewing court, begs the question, 
as the entire issue is whether copayments lead to savings. In any event, the court 
found this level of consideration — reference plus conclusion — sufficient to 
overcome arbitrariness review. Betlach, No. CV-12-08098-PCT-DGC. 
100 See, e.g., leighton Ku & viCtoriA WAChino, Ctr. on budget & Pol’y PrioritieS, 
the eFFeCt oF inCreASed CoSt-ShAring in mediCAid: A SummAry oF reSeArCh 
FindingS (2005).
101 Robyn Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated with Prescription Drug Cost-
Sharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 J. Am. med. ASS’n 421 (2001).
102 Neal T. Wallace et al., How Effective Are Copayments in Reducing Expenditures 
for Low-Income Adult Medicaid Beneficiaries? Experience from the Oregon 
Health Plan, 43 heAlth Serv. & reS. 515 (2008).
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should have been severed from the remainder of the application, as they were 
unlikely to promote cost savings or program sustainability. And considered 
independently of savings, it is difficult to see how the copayments might 
promote the objectives of the Act.
This type of severability analysis runs into a problem of information similar 
to that noted above, that is, that the court does not have good information 
about what can be severed and what cannot. This is, indeed, why more 
formal administrative procedures have such importance. The dialog between 
the agency and the public — segments of which will likely have relevant 
knowledge — in the administrative record promises to greatly enhance the 
ability of courts to resolve such questions. This point also illustrates why it 
is problematic for an agency to opt out of providing responses to comments,103 
a procedural shortcoming that calls for reform.
ii. Arbitrariness
The second legal question is more garden variety, and represents a longstanding 
question in administrative law — how searching should the Secretary’s analysis 
be? In the context of waivers, how much evidence should the agency demand 
of the state before approving a waiver? The Betlach court ends up deferring 
to the agency in this respect, too, seemingly requiring little of the Secretary. 
But this form of deference is not required of courts, and here it might have 
led to a different outcome.
Consider the state’s justification for the waiver: program sustainability. 
The Secretary ended up siding with this view. Here, I do not want to question 
the substantive validity of that view — which may or may not be there — but 
instead the level of evidence that the Secretary required of the state before 
siding with its view. It appears that the initial agency approval arrived on 
the basis of a letter from the Governor of Arizona stating that the state had 
a budget crisis and that the program must be reformed “to assure its future 
sustainability.”104 Outside of this letter, the agency does not appear to have had 
any other evidence from the state supporting its position that the copayments 
rule was necessary to save the program: for example, no exhibits from budget 
experts, no study of the agency budget.
I have already identified one area in which the Secretary’s analysis might 
have been more searching: on the connection between copayments and program 
savings. To the court’s credit, the initial litigation led to a remand, in part, 
on this basis; but the agency action on remand seems to have approved the 
waiver with only the barest acknowledgment of the issue, an acknowledgment 
103 42 C.F.R. 431.416(d).
104 Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 849. 
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that won the agency summary judgment in the subsequent litigation. Given 
studies finding little connection between copayments and cost savings, the 
court would have been on solid ground to remand again for a more serious 
analysis of the issue.
The court’s relaxed posture manifests elsewhere, too. One fact to emerge 
in the course of litigation was that, for the fiscal year preceding the waiver 
application, the state’s Medicaid program, in fact, ran a surplus of $167,000,000.105 
The court brushed off this revelation, on the grounds that “it was not part of 
the information before the agency at the time of the Secretary’s decision.”106 
But the agency was plainly in the position to require the state to make some 
showing — beyond a letter from the Governor — of the pressing budget 
problems supposedly requiring the imposition of copayments. The approval 
might easily have been set aside under arbitrariness review on the basis that 
the agency apparently did little due diligence. 
***
The problems that manifest in the Betlach litigation reflect the concerns of 
the first portions of this Article. In particular, we have a state wishing to cut 
back on Medicaid benefits by imposing copayments. The forces driving this 
state request are likely multiple, but plausibly owe, at least in part, to the 
considerations in Part II. Even more evident are the information problems 
discussed in Part III. In the Betlach litigation, a core issue was whether the state 
required the benefits cuts to ensure program sustainability. The state asserted 
this fact, and the agency, under a permissive waiver regime, seems to have 
simply believed the assertion. The court followed suit. However, considerable 
evidence emerged in the course of litigation that, first, the program was not 
imposing a burden on the budget, and, second, in any event copayments were 
unlikely to improve the budget situation. Arizona, that is, appears to have failed 
to support the claimed budget rationale for the cuts, and a permissive approach 
to waivers allowed benefits cuts to ride on the unsubstantiated rationale. But as 
I suggest, more demanding doctrinal approaches — particularly if combined 
with more robust administrative procedures — may well be able to separate 
states such as Arizona from those that require cuts or other forms of policy 
innovation to promote the objectives of the Act. 
105 Id.
106 Id.
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conclusIon
Even as the problem of economic inequality is largely one of explosive growth 
in the right tail of the distribution, the left tail of the distribution also calls 
for particular attention. It is the left tail that bears the brunt of the economic 
changes producing inequality; it is the left tail where society has a moral 
obligation to ensure minimum standards of wellbeing; it is the left tail where 
we should be particularly eager to see signs of intergenerational mobility.
In the United States, states and the federal government jointly set many 
aspects of social service policy — they jointly set the policies, that is, that 
target the left tail of the distribution. As a window into this policymaking 
environment, I have examined Medicaid implementation, and in particular 
Medicaid expansion following the ACA. Medicaid holds great interest due 
to the size of the policy program — over 500 billion dollars in 2015107 — as 
well as its association with improvements in health, education, income, and 
intergenerational mobility in beneficiaries.108 At core, the question in this 
implementation architecture is whether we want more or less flexibility in 
the state-federal relationship given concerns over inequality. Of late, scholars 
have taken a relatively positive view of flexibility in the policymaking system.
A critical vehicle of policymaking flexibility is the administrative waiver, 
the subject of much discussion in academic and policy circles. Through this 
device, an implementing federal agency might waive statutory requirements 
that otherwise are binding on states. Those on both the left and the right 
have lauded the device: it opens a door to bipartisanship and permits policy 
innovation in the face of a gridlocked Congress. Waivers indeed offer a 
tempting alternative to the grind and rancor of legislation.
Yet insofar as one focuses on the vitality of safety net programs, waivers 
should be watched with a wary eye rather than cheered. The forces that operate 
at the level of state implementation tend to work towards cuts, and due to 
information problems federal administrators will have difficulty filtering out 
the meritorious applications from the non-meritorious applications. Moreover, 
as illustrated by litigation surrounding a recent waiver granted to Arizona, 
courts hardly represent a failsafe to protect statutory objectives. Recent reforms 
to administrative procedures hold promise, but they remain incomplete and 
should be amplified.
107 See Total Medicaid Spending, Fiscal Year 2015, henry KAiSer J. FAmily Found., 
http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/total-medicaid-spending/?dataView=0&
currentTimeframe=0 (last visited Dec. 9, 2016). 
108 See Brown et al., supra note 4.
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aPPendIxAPPENDIX  
This Appendix contains a simple formal model illustrating how information 
problems affect state-agency bargaining. The particular problem that 
agencies face is that they cannot easily determine the veracity of state 
justifications for their waiver requests.  
 
A. Bargaining Setup 
To illustrate this point, consider a simple bargaining model involving a 
liberal federal agency and a state. The state implementation, P, may be either 
full, F, low, L, or absent, A; that is, 𝑃𝑃 ∈ {𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿, 𝐴𝐴}. The prevailing state 
conditions, 𝜔𝜔, support either full, F, or low, L, levels of implementation (ie, 
𝜔𝜔 ∈ {𝐹𝐹, 𝐿𝐿}). As detailed below, the state prefers to implement the policy L 
regardless of state conditions, perhaps a nod to the fact that many lower-
income people do not vote or the other forces articulated above. The federal 
agency, by contrast, wishes to see the state implement the highest level of 
policy supported by state conditions.  
The sequence of the interaction is as follows:  
First, nature draws the state conditions, ω , with Pr(ω = F) = π , and 
therefore Pr(ω = L) =1−π . The state observes ω  but the agency does not.  
Second, the state decides whether to request a waiver to change policy from 
F to L; note that policy begins fully implemented, and the state then requests 
a waiver to implement some policy “innovation” that renders policy to L. If 
the state requests a waiver, it incurs a cost that reflects the difficulty of 
complying with the application procedures. An important but sensible 
assumption is that this cost is (weakly) lower for states when ω = L  than 
when ω = F  so that when the state conditions truly require P = L  it is 
easier to substantiate this fact than when state conditions would, in fact, 
support P = F .109 Let k  represent the waiver cost when ω = F  and k − t  
represent the waiver cost when ω = L , where k ≥ 0  and t ∈ [0,k] . These 
cost parameters represent the permissiveness of the federal government’s 
waiver policy, and a central objective is to understand how bargaining 
behavior is conditioned on them.  
Third, the agency grants or denies the waiver request. If the waiver is 
granted, then the policy is set to L and players receive payoffs. If the waiver 
is denied, the policy is set to F if ω = F , such that the state can sustain the 
policy, and to A if ω = L , such that the state cannot in fact sustain the 
                                                      
109  In other words, it is somewhat harder to lie than to tell the truth and maintain 
the appearance of integrity in an application.  
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policy. Players then receive payoffs. 
The policy payoffs thus depend on the policy selected and the underlying 
state conditions, as follows, first for the federal government, G: 
 
UG =
1 if P = F
0 if P = L







And likewise for the state, S: 
US =
1 if P = L
0 if P = F







Thus, neither the agency nor even the state wants to see the policy 
abandoned, but as indicated above they have different views on how 
generous to make the safety net program: the agency wants the most 
possible given state conditions; the state wants the lowest level of policy 
regardless of state conditions. Note that P defaults to A if the state-agency 
negotiation results in a policy choice that the state cannot support. 
The objective of the analysis is to consider salient perfect Bayesian 
equilibria of this state-agency bargaining interaction under various waiver 
regimes, where the regimes, again, find definition in the request costs. 
 
B. Overly Permissive Waiver Regime 
Consider initially the problems with an overly permissive waiver regime. 
Behaviorally, the defining characteristic of this waiver regime is that states 
in both conditions find it equally attractive to request waivers. This 
characteristic would follow, for instance, if k = t = 0 , so that neither type 
of state incurs a cost for requesting a waiver. More generally, any time that 
k <1  the incentives generating these equilibria prevail.  
That states of both types pool and find it worth requesting waivers gives rise 
to the possibility of a troubling equilibrium in which the federal agency 
indiscriminately accepts all applications. In particular, if π <
1
2 , an 
equilibrium exists in which states in both conditions request waivers, and 
the agency indiscriminately accepts the requests. The agency does so 
because, even though the application is uninformative, there is a good 
chance (1−π ) that the state condition is ω = L  and that the application is 
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truthful; for these states, rejecting the application would lead to an 
unappealing abandonment of the policy. Of course, this equilibrium is not 
particularly attractive for the federal government because, in many cases, 
states under-implement the statute when they are in a position to fully 
implement it. Yet the agency cannot easily ferret out these under-
implementing states, and so ends up granting all waivers. 
To see this more clearly, note that the agency cannot update beliefs due to 
the pooling strategies of states, so it must act based on priors. Under the 
candidate strategy of accepting the applications, it faces a payoff of 0, that 
is, because P=L. However, if the agency rejects the application, it faces a 
payoff of 𝜋𝜋 − (1 − 𝜋𝜋), such that we have P=A if 𝜔𝜔 = 𝐿𝐿, and P=F if 𝜔𝜔 = 𝐹𝐹. 
Thus, so long as π <
1
2  , the agency faces no incentive to deviate from the 
strategy of indiscriminately accepting all applications. The states, likewise, 
plainly face no incentive to deviate, as they are able to under-implement the 
statute, as is their preference, and the cost of applying, k, is less than 1.  
If π >
1
2  and 𝑘𝑘 < 1 there is also an equilibrium in which the L states 
always request waivers, and the F states mix, applying with probability 
1−π
π
, and the agency accepts the request with probability k . Note that the 
F-type state is indifferent between applying and not, and thus faces no 
incentive to deviate: that is, applying yields 𝜌𝜌 + 1 − 𝜌𝜌 0 − 𝑘𝑘, where 𝜌𝜌 
is the probability that the agency accepts the waiver; and not applying yields 
0; thus, if 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑘𝑘, the F-type state is indifferent. The agency, meanwhile, is 
also indifferent: accepting the application yields 0; and denying it yields, 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 1 + (1 − 𝜋𝜋)(−1), where 𝜋𝜋 is the probability that the F-type state 
applies; so that when 𝜋𝜋 = 678
8
, the agency is indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting the application. The L-type state, it is clear, faces no incentive 
to deviate.  
 
C. Overly Harsh Waiver Regime 
On the other side of regimes, consider a harsh waiver regime in which it is 
incredibly difficult for states to request waivers. Indeed, this might be 
thought of as a no-waiver regime. But to maintain the focus on request costs, 
let k − t >1 ; this means that, even for states in condition ω = L , the costs 
of seeking a waiver exceed any possible benefit.  
The relevant strategies to consider in this regime are straightforward: for 
states in both conditions, do not request a waiver. As suggested, the costs of 
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doing so exceed any possible benefit, and as a result neither state faces an 
incentive to deviate from these do-not-request strategies. The downside of 
this equilibrium, of course, is that some states truly require a waiver to 
operate the safety net program, and in this way refusing waivers results in 
an unnecessary diminution of the program.  
 
D. Effective Waiver Regime 
An effective waiver regime lies between the two extremes above: it neither 
encourages all states to request, nor does it discourage all states to request. 
Rather, it encourages the right kind of states to request a waiver. In the 
running example of this model, that is, it encourages states in condition 
ω = L  to apply, and those in condition ω = F  not to apply. This form of 
effective waiver regime, therefore, is moderate, neither permissive nor 
harsh. 
This regime is characterized by request costs that have two features: first, 
k >1 , which has the effect of discouraging the states in condition ω = F  
from requesting a waiver, and, second, k − t <1 , which has the effect of 
encouraging states in condition ω = L  to request a waiver. The states 
formulate strategies to this effect, and the federal agency, then, on seeing a 
waiver, knows that it is from a state that cannot effectively implement the 
full benefits program, and therefore grants the waiver. As can be readily 
verified, no type of state has an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. 
